Agreeable Instantia

This is an essay I wrote as an assignment for a class in Ethics during the Fall of 2018 as an undergraduate student at MIT. I still find ethics interesting today, and I am excited to share this work from my early introduction as a student to the practical application of ethics and justice. Truthfully, I wish this essay was longer, or more detailed in some places, but it is only one assignment from a number of writings from that Fall 2018 semester, I suppose it is a reminder to myself to continue curious inquiry into philosophy to develop nuanced and informed perspective. The essay is printed here in its original final drafted form, with only one or two corrections made for single word omissions and punctuation.

The Moral Imperative of Universality

Prompt:
John Stuart Mill writes of Kant:

This remarkable man . . . does . . . lay down a universal first principle as the origin and ground of moral obligation; it is this: — ‘So act, that the rule on which thou actest would admit of being adopted as a law by all rational beings’. But when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails, almost grotesquely, to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical (not to say physical) impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he shows is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur. (Utilitarianism, ch. 1)

Explain this objection in your own words. Then consider how Kant might respond, making reference to the Formula of Universal Law. Use specific examples. These can be Kant’s own examples or examples that you come up with yourself. Depending on how to shape your discussion, you might find it helpful to limit your focus to just one or two of the four main categories of duties Kant mentions. Defend Kant as persuasively as you can. Then evaluate that defense. Do you think Kant can give an adequate reply to Mill’s objection? Why or why not?

In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant introduces his arguments about the moral character of existence. The first of these is the Formula of Universal Law

Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law

Mill’s objection to Kant’s argument relies on what he believes to be a contradiction in Kant’s assertion. Mill argues that the moral character of non-universally acceptable actions are not distinguished by Kant’s maxim. Kant’s maxim is unique because it attempts to assess so called ‘duties of morality’ from a decisive perspective. This crucial perspective is the ‘universal’ one. Mill’s argument is that the application of this universal perspective is not a reliable assessment of morality. When Mill asserts “but when he begins to deduce from this precept any of the actual duties of morality, he fails” he is challenging the concept that the universal perspective adopted by Kant’s maxim outlines a logical moral imperative. Mill writes that the supposed immoral characters under Kant’s maxim would recognize that ‘no one would choose to incur’ the consequences of the universal adoption of their own actions, but could just as easily deny the moral authority of Kant’s maxim. The appearance of the phrase ‘no one’ in Mill’s argument is important as it demonstrates that Mill does concede to some of the logical consequences of Kant’s argument, but not all of them. The assertion that ‘no one’ would choose to incur the consequences of bad actions under Kant’s maxim is more attributable to Kant’s maxim than Mill’s own argument—because the maxim is ‘universal’, those who disobey it ostensibly alter their status as beings according to this maxim. Kant chooses to interpret this alteration as a moral breakdown, while Mill rejects the moral consequences of this alteration.

Despite Mill’s criticism Kant’s maxim has its own ground to stand on. When an individual subjects themselves to the universal perspective of Kant’s maxim, they afford themselves a method to classify their actions. Kant argues that this classification offers a compelling moral standard.

Thus suppose the mind of that same friend of humanity were clouded over with his own grief, extinguishing all his sympathetic participation in the fate of others; he still has the resources to be beneficent to those suffering distress, but the distress of others does not touch him because he is sufficiently busy with his own; and now, where no inclination any longer stimulates him to it, he tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any inclination, solely from duty; only then does it for the first time have its authentic moral worth

This passage is an important one as Kant begins the paragraph with ‘To be beneficent where one can is a duty’, anchoring the undertones of his argument in a relationship between the beneficiaries of his moral imperative and their duties. The ‘friend of humanity’ Kant speaks of is one who adheres to the universal perspective he advocates for, but finds themselves stricken with grief. Kant argues that when these people are stripped of their inclinations, their actions are necessarily performed ‘solely from duty’, which then reveals the potential of their moral worth. Kant’s argument serves its point well by clearly separating moral worth and inclinations. However, Mill’s criticism takes advantage of the nuances of this separation. Kant characterizes inclinations or urges as inferior to good will as good will ‘is to be estimated far higher than anything that could be brought about by it in favor of any inclination’. Understanding Kant’s view of inclinations and good will, his choice to single out individuals who may be ‘clouded over’ with grief is a pivotal one. If these people truly are beneficiaries of Kant’s argument then it seems reasonable to say that when they take action, they do so not out of any personal urge nor any universally adversarial aim. It is here that Kant chooses to reveal what he believes to be authentic moral worth. Whether or not individuals consider the moral implications of Kant’s classifications is entirely up to them—Kant recognizes this in his writing:

On this account even wisdom—which consists more in deeds and omissions than in knowledge— also needs science, not in order to learn from it but in order to provide entry and durability for its precepts. The human being feels in himself a powerful counterweight against all commands of duty, which reason represents to him as so worthy of esteem, in his needs and inclinations, whose satisfaction he summarizes under the name of ‘happiness’… From this, however, arises a natural dialectic, that is, a propensity to ratiocinate against those strict laws of duty and to bring into doubt their validity, or at least their purity and strictness, and, where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes and inclinations, i.e., at ground to corrupt them and deprive them of their entire dignity, which not even common practical reason can in the end call good.

This passage provides an important opportunity to understand Kant’s understanding of Mill’s criticism of his argument, the ‘account’ he speaks of is one of innocence, an important perspective to test the validity of the logic and morality of Kant’s imperative. The well read beneficiary of Mill’s criticism may easily assert that following:

There is no logical contradiction in universalizing an immoral act.

According to Kant, these beneficiaries of Mill’s criticism feel ‘a powerful counterweight against all commands of duty’. Importantly, Kant notes that the beneficiaries of Mill’s criticism may derive knowledge from Kant’s own deductions. More importantly, Kant challenges the quality of this knowledge. Although Kant’s moral imperative is logical, his emboldened attempt to link logic and morality, and by extension knowledge and innocence is obviously a difficult one to make. In an attempt to apply a Kantian sense of good will to Mill’s criticism of Kant it makes sense to ask about which excluded perspectives may be moral or innocent. For example, what does an individual stand to gain from relaxing their efforts to preserve the universality of their actions in the absence of self-inclination? Kant’s maxim is powerful, at minimum, it communicates important information about the qualities of an action, is it able to be universalized. Kant chooses to interpret this as a compelling moral standard. However in the above passage he recognizes the interpretation of these messages as scientific knowledge, which provides an important concession, considering that this view underpins Mill’s criticism of Kant’s moral imperative.

Kant’s Formula of Universal Law may provide a compelling moral imperative, but Mill’s criticism reveals weaknesses in the appeal of the moral standard Kant argues for. Kant’s maxim certainly does provide important information about the qualities of an action, but I believe Mill’s criticism demonstrates that Kant’s maxim alone does not provide enough information about the qualities of an action to fully outline a satisfactory moral imperative. In an attempt to reconcile Mill’s criticism with Kant’s imperative, it makes sense to ask whether Kant’s moral imperative could be extended to any of the beneficiaries of Mill’s criticism. In philosophy, it has been argued that some qualities have ‘location’ i.e. that elements of their definition cannot be effectively defined because they are specific to whatever instance or situation in which an individual encounters the quality. This concept of location could be sparingly applied to Kant’s concept of universality. Implicit in the imperative of Kant’s formula is the domain over which the imperative holds. Kant’s choice of universality turns out to be conveniently modest, avoiding potential pitfalls of specificity. By defining the domain to be universal, Kant frees himself from the implications of any functional connection between the characteristics of the domain of his moral imperative and the structure of those same moral imperatives.

As a more concrete example, I would assert that all members of groups are beneficiaries of Mill’s criticism as well as Kant’s argument. The degree to which they benefit from each position is determined by the group’s ability to universalize its actions. By virtue of the fact that the group has defining characteristics, there will be barriers to the groups ability to universalize its actions. Ultimately, any morality derived from the group’s imperatives will depend heavily on the morality of the divisions engendered by the group. Kant’s argument demonstrates that he understands that it is logically important for a moral imperative to be able to be applied universally, but Mill’s criticism highlights the logical importance of a moral imperative’s sensitivity to its subjects’ defining characteristics.